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RICHARD W. BOSS 
COLLECTION HAS always been a concern of librarians, but SECURITY 
recent publicity about major thefts and vandalism has sharpened inter- 
est in the development of a systematic approach to the problem. The 
most famous case is probably that of James Shinn, who allegedly stole 
rare books valued at some $500,000 from colleges and universities 
around the country before his arrest in 1982. In the same year Thomas 
Freeman, a former Princeton student, was arrested on charges of steal- 
ing more than 3000 books from the open shelves of more than a dozen 
libraries in New Jersey. Only a short time later, some 5600 books were 
recovered from the apartment of Glenn Swartz in Los Angeles, most of 
them from the open shelves of Los Angeles Public Library’s Central 
Library. 
Book theft is only one serious security concern of libraries. In the 
period from 1972 to 1980 there wereat least thirty-two reported incidents 
in which fires were set in locations ranging from book returns and mail 
slots to bookstacks. Of the sixteen arsonists who were apprehended, two 
were library employees. In 1982, an arsonist set fire to the Hollywood 
Branch of the Los Angeles Public.Library and caused some $3.5 million 
in damage, including the destruction of more than 65,000 volumes. 
Other forms ofvandalism are generally not as well documented as fires, 
but their incidence is even greater. 
Richard W. Boss is senior consultant, Information Systems Consultants, Bethesda, 
Maryland. 
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Losses 
While there has been no national inventory to determine the extent 
of losses suffered by the nation’s libraries from theft and vandalism, 
estimates range as high as $250 million a year. Individual institutions 
have reported collection loss rates of 3 percent and more per year. When 
this is compared with gross acquisition rates of 5 percent or less per year, 
the effect is staggering. Even worse, the thieves have the advantage of 
being able to steal the best of the selections made by librarians. Loss 
from arson and other forms of vandalism is believed to be 10 percent of 
the total losses. 
Response to Losses 
Librarians commonly respond to losses in a reactive, rather than a 
proactive manner. A common reaction to headlines about thefts else- 
where or evidence of local losses is to purchase an electronic theft 
detection system; the reaction to vandalism is to secure vulnerable doors 
and windows, and install burglar alarms and smoke detectors. 
Electronic theft detection in libraries has become a growth industry 
with vendors selling or leasing 500 new electronic detection systems 
annually. The total number of installations is now over 3500. Are the 
collections protected by such systems truly secure from theft, or do the 
librarians have a false sense of security? Libraries have recently begun to 
install burglar alarms and smoke/fire detectors, but is there any evi- 
dence that this has deterred theft and vandalism? 
While of value in controlling losses, theft detection systems can 
instill a false sense of security because they protect only the entrances at 
which they are placed. The systems stop the forgetful and theunskilled, 
but offer no  protection against a person intent on stealing. A number of 
the libraries that suffered losses at the hands of Shinn and Freeman had 
electronic security systems in place and operational. Nor are burglar 
and smoke/fire alarms fully reliable, because in several of the arson 
incidents reported in the past three years the protective systems were not 
working or had been incapacitated. 
It is generally recognized that any security system can be comprom- 
ised. The targets or strips placed in books to trigger the theft detection 
alarm can be removed, the book or other library material can be 
wrapped in shielding material, or a powerful magnet can be used to foil 
the sensors. Smoke detectors cannot only be deactivated, but can be set 
off again and again so that they cease to be taken seriously. 
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These problems are beyond the control of individual librarians 
except insofar as they can influence vendors to improve the reliability of 
their products. However, there are a number of factors which affect 
security which are within control of the librarian. They are the subject 
of this article. 
Defining Security Needs 
Traditionally, security has been a matter of devising safeguards in 
reaction to specific losses. That is to say, when a loss occurs a new 
safeguard is introduced to protect against recurrence of that type of loss 
in the future. Libraries cannot afford the luxury of continuing such an 
approach; security must be viewed in the broadest possible sense and 
librarians should engage in anticipatory planning. 
Library administrators should define the collection security needs 
broadly, encompassing in the review the security of materials from theft, 
fire, flood, and vandalism. Included in the definition should be protec- 
tion of materials against removal from the inventory by modifying 
machine-readable bibliographic records. This is the area which has 
been most widely ignored. Librarians have apparently assumed that 
their computers function in benign environments. The major concerns 
appear to have been accidental losses of records from errors, omissions 
and natural disasters. The experience of the business community sug- 
gests that security planning should also encompass the protection of 
computer records against deliberate alteration. 
A library should not limit its approach to the physical protection of 
assets through such means as locks, barriers and guards. Security audits 
of several public and academic libraries have revealed numerous archi- 
tectural elements, policies and procedures that seriously limit the use- 
fulness of the electronic security system in those libraries. These will be 
discussed in the next several pages. 
Typical Facilities’ Weaknesses 
Virtually every library has some windows that open yet lack secure 
screens. Library materials can be dropped to the ground and picked up 
later. A single unsecured window can mean the loss of hundreds of items 
annually. On one college campus i t  has been general knowledge among 
students that the “long-term checkout windows” are in the restrooms. 
Emergency exits are also a frequent weak point. Some are not 
equipped with alarms; many alarms are not in working order because 
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they are not tested at regular intervals; and most are located beyond the 
visual control of the staff. Staff in libraries periodically hear the alarm 
go off, but, when it takes several minutes to reach the door, there is 
nothing they can do but shrug their shoulders. 
Libraries are equally vulnerable to illegal after hours entry. 
Ground floor windows without grills, and doors with breakable glass, 
removable hinge pins and without dead-bolt locks are common. 
Fire and smoke detectors are often placed so low that they can be 
disconnected, broken or set off. Settings of smoke detectors often are not 
properly calibrated or maintained so that a person blowing cigarette 
smoke can set them off. 
Computer rooms are often kept unstaffed and unlocked. The key is 
usually on a master available to a large number of people. Most compu- 
ter rooms are equipped only with a single fire extinguisher which staff 
may not be trained how to use. 
Policy and Procedure Weaknesses 
Many of the weaknesses in a library’s security are not attributed to 
physical conditions, but to policies and procedures which aid the cul- 
prit or which annoy patrons and staff and lead to anti-library attitudes. 
Among the policies and procedures that weaken a library’s security are: 
1. 	 Restrictiue access conditions. Libraries with very limited evening 
and weekend hours discourage frequent trips to the library and thus 
encourage theft. The situation may be aggravated by lack of parking 
and public transportation. 
2. 	Keys. Keys to the library are given out freely to users and staff and no 
regular inventory of keyholders is maintained. The keys are fre- 
quently of the type that can be easily duplicated. Locks are seldom 
changed. 
3. 	E x i t  control. There may be no exit control or the control point may 
be staffed for long hours by people who lack the interest and the 
interpersonal skills to be effective in screening patrons. Staff man- 
ning such control points are rarely given any special training for 
their tasks. The flow of people leaving may be unrestricted so that 
people can freely pass behind those being inspected. 
4. 	Unauthorized possession /occupancy. Many libraries lack written 
policies and procedures to guide the action to be taken upon the 
discovery of a person in the possession of library materials which 
have not been properly charged out, or when an unauthorized 
person is found in the the building after hours. In the absence of 
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appropriate guidelines, employees must use their own judgment in 
these situations. The possibility of patron complaints, and the 
threat that employees may be cautioned against overzealousness as a 
result, leads many to play it safe rather than risk offense. 
5.  	Rules and statutes. Library rules and statutes of the associated 
municipality, corporation or academic institution frequently fail to 
address penalties for the unauthorized removal of, or damage to, 
library materials. 
6. Property marking. Some libraries do not stamp all edges and the 
title pages of library materials because of concern about aesthetics or 
cost. Microforms are often not marked at all. 
7. 	Loans and renewals. Short loan periods and/or restrictive renewal 
policies may encourage unauthorized removal or retention of 
library materials as may the categorization of open stacks materials 
as noncirculating. 
8. 	Circulation systems. Policies or systems which do not require a 
borrower to have a library or identification card to charge out 
library materials can encourage delinquency. Circulation control 
systems which use machine- ,but not eye-readable transaction cards 
are open to abuse in that borrowers can switch cards from one item 
to another. 
9. 	Photocopying. Invitations for abuse may be increased when photo- 
copy machines are limited in number, poorly located, ill-
maintained, or expensive. 
10. Security manual. Every library should have a security manual 
setting forth what to do to maintain security and how to deal with 
emergencies. It should include at least the following: 
-Each staff member’s responsibilities for maintaining security and 
in emergencies. 
-Appropriate phone numbers for fire, police, library adminis- 
trators, etc. 

-Location of power switches. 

-Copies of insurance policies. 

-Documentation for recovery after an emergency. 

11. Termination. Security can be endangered by the lack of systematic 
procedures for library cards to be renewed periodically or surren- 
dered when leaving the institution or organization. Similar prob- 
lems result from a failure to recover employee identification and 
keys from departing employees. 
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Conducting a Security Audit 
Electronic security systems, burglar and smoke/fire alarms do 
probably reduce losses, but they cannot indefinitely compensate for the 
lack of an overall security plan. Such a plan can be developed by 
auditing library facilities, policies and procedures to identify the factors 
that may contribute to poor security. A series of procedures can then be 
developed to address the weaknesses. 
Before expending any funds on electronic security devices or any 
other security measures, a library should be subjected to a systematic 
security audit to determine its vulncrability. The cost of such an audit 
will be a small fraction of the cost of the security measures and will 
assure that the steps taken are responsive to local needs, not ones 
reported by other libraries. The elements in a security audit should 
include: 
I. Nature of the community, campus or organization 
A. General description 
B. Size 
C. Degree of isolation 
D. Prominence of the collections 
E. Attitudes of staff and users 
11. Indicators of security weaknesses 
A. Evidence of theft 
1. Complaints 
2. Collection count 
3. Inventory 
4. Random sampling 
B. Evidence of vandalism, including mutilation 
C. Patterns of past losses 
D. Existence of valuable special collections 
E. Vulnerability of building 
F. Lack of key policy 
G. Lack of written closing procedures 
H. Lack of unauthorized possession/occupancy policy 
I. Lack of written access policy 
J. Inflexible loan policy 
K. Inflexible renewal policy 
L. Lack of written termination procedure 
1. Employees 
2. Patrons 
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M. Limited property marking 
N. No participation in theft alerting clearinghouses 
111. Observation of present security points 
A. Principal exit(s) 
1. Location(s) necessary 




a. Full search 
b. Random search 
c. Casual 
d. Purses checked 
4. Restricted flow 
5. Patron behavior 
6. Characteristics of doors and locks 
B. Emergency exit(s) 
1. Visual control 
2. Alarm 
3. Electronic recording 
4. Characteristics of doors and locks 
C. Employee exit(s) 
I .  Visual control 
2. Staffed 
3. Locked 
4. Characteristics of doors and locks 
D. Loading dock 
1. Visual control 
2. Staffed 
3. Locked 
4. Characteristics of doors and locks 
E. Windows 
1. Locked 
2. Secured with screens 
3. Alarm 
4. Ease of breakage 
F. Utility tunnel(s) 
1. Locked 
2. Exits 
G. Ceiling type 
1. Access to security system 
2. Crawl space 
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H. After hours concealment 
1. Ease of concealment 
2. Ease of exit 
I. Special collections 
1. Locked 
2. Alarm 
3.  Characteristics of doors, windows, ceilings 
4. Ease of concealment 
5 .  Ease of exit 
J. Exhibit cases 
1. Secure 
2. Alarm 
K. After hours book return 
1. Capacity 
2. Ease of removal 
3.  Ease of vandalism/arson 
L. Smokelfire detectors 
1. Adequate number 
2. Reachable 
3. Evidence of damage/inoperation or poor maintenance 
4. Ease of false alarm 
M. Computer room 
1. Staffed 
2. Locked 
3.  Availability of key 
4. Back-up for files kept off-site 
5. Fire detection 
6. Automatic fire extinguishing 
7. Use of passwording and other access controls 
8. Audit trails for record changes 
The Cost of Security 
Typically, the cost of a security program for a library with 100,000 
volumes will be $5,000 to $10,000 to revise policies and procedures, 
change locks and install alarms, and repair other defects. This does not 
include the installation of an electronic security system. Larger libraries 
will have to spend correspondingly more. For many libraries the $5,000 
figure represents only 165 volumes since the average item now costs $30 
to acquire and process. The investment is, therefore, almost always 
justified. 
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Nevertheless, such expenditures should not be made without 
knowing the current rate of loss. What percentage of the collection is 
actually lost in a twelve-month period? Most library administrators do 
not wish to undertake inventories to determine loss rates. There are two 
less expensive options: (1)random sampling, and (2)a collection census 
or the actual counting of the number of volumes on two separate 
occasions. Both are described in Alice H. Bahr’sBook The f t  and Library 
Security Systems.’ Libraries unable to reduce their losses after undertak- 
ing the minimum program should consider the installation of one or 
more electronic security systems. 
Cost-Effectiveness 
Libraries should not seek to remedy every possible security weak- 
ness. Cost-effectiveness should always be kept in mind. Safeguards may 
involve a wide range of costs-from no cost to prohibitive cost. A risk 
analysis can determine the potential for loss without the safeguards. 
What is the likelihood that there will be a loss if an action isn’t taken and 
what is the probable extent of the loss? Since there is no rule of thumb or 
standard by which to determine how much should be spent for a 
safeguard given a specific cost risk, the “prudent person” method could 
be followed. The prudent-person criterion is that even if a loss is 
sustained, a prudent person would agree that sufficient safeguards were 
in place to protect against the loss. Therefore, those held accountable for 
the assets should be held blameless. This rule is not particularly satisfy- 
ing or practical, but is symptomatic of the state of the art. 
The Human Element 
In implementing any security program, human costs and reliabil- 
ity should be kept in mind. A safeguard that requires no human opera- 
tion or intervention during its operation is usually superior to a 
safeguard with equivalent protective capabilities that requires human 
involvement. For example, if access to an area can be controlled through 
a simple, logical, algorithmic process and few or no exceptions are 
necessary, then an automatic door-access mechanism could be superior 
to stationing a guard at the door. Manual functions are generally 
weakest in a safeguard. The human element must be assessed not only as 
i t  operates during the routine functioning of the safeguard, but also 
how it will operate when the person is distracted or negligent. 
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Conclusion 
A library cannot eliminate losses, but i t  can reduce them if it 
undertakes an audit of its facilities, policies and procedures and if it 
takes such steps as are cost effective within its range of potential loss. It 
should expect to remain vulnerable to the skilled thief and the malicious 
vandal and should periodically repeat the security audit and random 
sampling of its collection. The library should participate in theft alert- 
ing service for rare books and should arrange with local buyers of 
second-hand books to alert it when materials bearing the library’s 
property markings are offered for sale. If an automated system is used, 
the files should be protected against tampering and a bark-up copy 
should be kept at a remote, secure location. 
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